

ASEAN-INDONESIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM IN INDONESIA SINCE OCTOBER 2002 - 2009

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Abstract

Terrorism and counterterrorism have become high priorities in Indonesia. Several bomb explosions since the fall of New Order government in 1998 until the J.W. Marriott and Ritz - Carlton hotels on July 17, 2009 such as Christmas Eve bombing, Bali bombing, Australian Embassy and J.W.Marriot bombing demonstrates that terrorism is a continuous threat. This paper discusses the counterterrorism measures taking by the Indonesian government to deal the problem. The aim of this study is: to verify support given by ASEAN Countries to fight terrorism in Indonesia. To get the specific information and data, the writer uses two kinds of research methods which are field research (observation, data collection, data analysis) and library Research. The writer used this method by reading and taking sources from books found in the library and looking for the other material that have relationship with this observation. The result of study describes counterterrorism cooperation between ASEAN and Indonesia, such as intelligence sharing, joint training of law enforcement, and efforts to standardize legal definitions of terrorism. ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and its member countries have been addressing the issue of terrorism at the national, bilateral and multilateral basis over the years. The ASEAN Leaders viewed terrorism as a profound threat to international peace and security and "a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020". Furthermore, this paper seeks to plot the trajectory of ASEAN-Indonesia counterterrorism cooperation from the Bali bombing of October 2002 through the J.W.Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels of July 2009.

INTRODUCTION

Global terrorism at the present time had became as a hot issue worldwide. It's importance had attracted attention from various people including world leaders in giving their opinion about the importance to have a most effective method to counter its threats from spread and affected the world's security. One of the lessons gained from trying to define terrorism bears repeating: terrorism is a method, a way some people and groups seek to attain their objectives. As such, there is no common enemy in fighting terrorism. Nor is there a common

cause for the terrorists. Combating terrorism, then, requires challenging, some might say “civilizing,” the ways in which states, groups, and individuals carry out their political or religious agendas.

Strategies and Approaches Employed by the ASEAN Countries to Counter Terrorism in Indonesia

1. General Overview of the Study

Despite the fact that security is an essential concept in international relations, it is a “contested concept”¹ with changes in its meaning during different historical periods. World events in the 1970s and 1980s undercut subsystem security analysis. Détente failed; indeed, the Reagan era initiated a dramatic return to bipolarity in the so-called “second cold war” (Kelly,2007:197-229). The traditional view of security with its strong emphasis on state security and the use of military power has shifted to a broader perspective which also incorporates economic, societal, and environmental dimensions under the framework of non-traditional security issues. This debate over the concept of security has also provoked a broader discourse on regional security cooperation, particularly regarding the problem of maintaining a stable peace in a region in counterterrorism section.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established by meeting in Bangkok in August 1967 of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia as founding members. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma) and Cambodia joined later. The aims of ASEAN, according to its Declaration are:

(1)To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and (2) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among the countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations charter (ASEAN Secretariat).

¹ W.B.Gallie (1956) introduced a phrase namely ‘contested concept’, which does not simply mean that it is difficult to agree on a definition of a concept, but there are some concepts whose meaning are inherently a matter of dispute, for there is no such a neutral definition, see Barry Buzan. 1991. *People, State and Fear 2nd Edition*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. P.7.

Furthermore, at the core of ASEAN's philosophy are the concepts of *musjawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus), codified in the key 1976 Declaration of the ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In ASEAN discussions, each party articulates its viewpoints before a final decision is made. Decisions are rendered on the basis of mutual consent rather than votes and a solution must be agreeable to all parties before it is adopted. In the event of a deadlock, ASEAN generally drops the issue and resorts to bilateral negotiations.

ASEAN is the premier regional association in East Asia and the most prominent regional grouping in the Third World. Moreover, ASEAN has been seen as one of the most successful regional organizations in the world outside European Union (Eng.1999:51; Hass,1989). Since its inauguration in 1967, during the height of the wars in Indochina, ASEAN has come to be regarded as an important factor for stability in Southeast Asia through its own cooperative activities, its policies of maintaining active dialogues with the major powers and other Asia Pacific countries, and its promotion of wider cooperation forums in East Asia and the Asia Pacific.

Furthermore, ASEAN was a product of the period of the Cold War in Southeast Asia and it gained its greatest influence through its role in the most serious conflict of the Cold War era in the region in the last two decades; Cambodja. ASEAN had avoided applying the word *security* in its framework of cooperation during the Cold War, even though its focus has always been security since its early days. The word *security* does not appear explicitly in the Bangkok Declaration 1967. The only item in the Declaration referring to regional security was a call for the promotion of "regional peace and stability" (Severino,2004:2).

ASEAN adheres to a number of fundamental principles, according to its Secretariat, such as: 'mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all actors'; "the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion'; 'non-interference in the internal affairs of one

another'; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner'; 'renunciation of the threat or use of force'; and 'effective cooperation among themselves' (ASEAN Secretariat). The fundamental principles apparently reflects the notion that regional peace and stability can be achieved on the basis of common interests in the economic, social, and cultural fields or in other words, achieving peace through a non-security road.

Furthermore, in 1974, Australia was the first country to establish a multilateral relationship with ASEAN. Australia's interests in ASEAN have been reaffirmed by the Rudd Government, which in July 2008 appointed an Ambassador to the Association. After its cautious beginning in 1967, ASEAN gained a substantial regional and international profile in the 1970s and 1980s when it pioneered economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and also played an important political role in both the Indochina refugee crisis (from 1978-79) and the conflict over Cambodia (after 1978). Since the late 1990s, ASEAN has made substantial efforts to maintain its profile and prominence. After the end of the Cambodia conflict and with Cold War tensions reduced in East Asia, ASEAN was able to realise the intentions of the founders by moving to accept Vietnam (in 1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) as members, so that the group could now represent Southeast Asia overall.

However, the wider membership increased the diversity within ASEAN and made economic integration harder to pursue. While most new members accepted the ASEAN 'rules of the game', Myanmar's intransigent autocratic regime has damaged ASEAN's cohesion and its international image. ASEAN's prestige was compromised by the adverse regional impact of the Asian financial crisis (from July 1997), which reduced growth rates in many members. ASEAN has also been challenged by the rise of China and India, whose size and high growth rates have attracted high levels of attention from foreign investors and trading partners and security dilemma posed by the event of the 9/11. Having said that, it is an important period to test the achievements and limitations of this regional project, as ASEAN has had to face some difficulties in coping with the events above, and this has

opened up some critical views on ASEAN's capacity in dealing with security issues. Therefore, this study on the ASEAN Security Community (henceforth, ASC) particularly ASEAN-Indonesia cooperation to counter terrorism will be framed under the nexus of two concepts, regionalism and security, in order to provide insights into how a regional project responds to change in the discourse on security as well as new security threats at the empirical level.

To meet this new challenge ASEAN has needed to redefine its framework of cooperation through a process of securitization in incorporating new security challenges. On the one hand, non-traditional security² issues such as maritime piracy, human rights, political openness, immigrant workers, illegal trade, separatist movement often cross the boundaries, economic interdependence, people smuggling, illicit drug trafficking, and environmental degradation have diminished the quality of societal security and posed a challenge to regional peace and stability. On the other hand, the change of discourse on security at the global level indeed gives a space for ASEAN to define its conception of security which is in accordance with its basic objective of preserving regional peace and stability.

The inclusion of non-traditional security issues has also brought a new dilemma. Overcoming non-traditional security issues requires non-military responses which are in accordance with ASEAN's modalities when its member states rejected military cooperation during its early establishment. It also discloses the fact that the emergence of non-traditional security issues may undermine the role of the state in the process of securitization. The transnational character of non-traditional issues also requires the active involvement of non-state actors such as civil society and international organizations to handle these issues.

² This study would like to underline the difference between non-traditional security and human security as some scholars apply the two concepts interchangeably. Human security as defined by the United Nations Human Development Report 1994 includes "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life". However, for the purpose of this study on the ASEAN Security Community, this study would apply non-traditional security as this concept embraces a wide range of issues ranging from those which are classified as "human security", trans-national crimes, such as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, and maritime piracy, and the problem of internal insurgencies.

Moreover, following the 9/11, the assumption of the decreasing role of the state dealing with new security challenges becomes arguable, as the war on terrorism in South East Asian (henceforth, SEA) has increased the role of the state as the main actor in the process of securitization. Although terrorism is classified as a non-traditional security threat, how to respond to this threat is determined by conventional configurations of states, for example, in terms of their use of force. It also makes the difference between national and regime security indistinct as national governments tend to employ the idea of war on terrorism as an opportunity to success over their political opponents and not to protect the society *per se*. In other words, the war on terrorism has given states more space to reassert themselves against societal forces as an important object of reference for non-traditional security sector.

Subsequently, this dilemma had provoked an initiative from Indonesia at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003. Indonesia proposed that ASEAN should transform itself into an ASC. The ASC through its ASEAN Plan of Action has two essential roles. First, it is an early step for ASEAN to valiantly shift from an old way of defining security into an acknowledgement of security as an indispensable instrument of maintaining peace and stability in the region. Second, the ASC Plan of Action is also a means of reconciling traditional and non-traditional security issues. For instance, the idea of providing ASEAN with a set of mechanism of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building is an approach to reconcile both kinds of security issues under a broad frameworks of regional security cooperation.

The combination of the change of discourse on security in the post Cold War as the normative element and the material element of the new security challenges faced by ASEAN has brought together the idea of creating the ASC. Through the ASC, the enduring idea of peace and stability in the region can be transformed from a “non-security road towards peace” to “security road towards peace”. Moreover, the ASC through its Plan of Action is a

blueprint on which way ASEAN attempts to overcome the problem of incorporating non-traditional issues, by reconciling both traditional and non-traditional security issues at the member state and the ASEAN levels.

This study will develop a discussion on the change form of regional security cooperation by the ASC. However, the idea of creating the ASC cannot merely be explained through the lens of the concept of security community (Deutsch, *et.al*, 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Acharya, 2001). Applying the concept of security community in this study is important to envisage how member states build a common understanding on the idea of security and create a mutual responsiveness to handle security challenges through the mechanism of regional cooperation in preserving peace and stability. As the re-emergence of state security has been the important feature of regional security in the post 9/11, it is also vital to look the process of defining security at the national level in order to have a complete picture on what has taken place at the regional level as well as describing security relations between states as security itself is indeed a relational phenomenon. Moreover, the emergence of non-traditional security issues have brought a new dilemma on how to reconcile traditional and non-traditional security issues at the national and regional levels.

Therefore, this study will explain the shifting of the regional security cooperation in ASEAN particularly cooperation between ASEAN-Indonesia to counter terrorism in Indonesia by examining both a series of cataclysmic events which posed new security challenges – terrorism – as the material element as well as the normative element in terms of the change of the notion of security. This study will particularly point out how the combination the two elements has brought impacts on one ASEAN member state, Indonesia. By understanding two different logics of security at the state level, it is projected that this study will be able to represent a transformation within ASEAN, where the change of the idea of security and the emergence of some events that have taken place since 9/11 entail the shifting of the regional security cooperation, which has led to the creation of the ASC. These only take

place when member states have built a common understanding on the notion of security and on how to develop an enhanced regional cooperation dealing with the new security challenges. This study will also apply Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Waever,2003) to fill the gap of the concept of security community in analyzing the idea of the ASC. As ASEAN's conception of security is mainly shaped by its member states, however, it is important to examine the relationship between transnational process, state power, and security politics which the concept of security community overlooks. At last, the combination of constructivist and neo-realist approaches on security will embrace the discussion of the new discourse on security in ASEAN.

2. ASEAN: The Nexus of Regionalism and Terrorism

ASEAN as a model for regional cooperation has achieved a significant unity in diversity and appears to challenge conventional wisdom of regional integration by creating a highlevel of cooperation through a limited level of institutionalization. Although it has been considered successful, several events that took place since 1990s have changed the facade of ASEAN as a regional cooperation. The end of the Cold War; ASEAN enlargement to Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodja; the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis in 1997; and the 9/11 have raised some questions on the capability of ASEAN to preserve regional security and institutional cohesiveness. Nonetheless, this study will be focus only post the 9/11 on terrorism.

Besides the aforementioned, ASEAN has been dealing since the begining 1970s with the problem of transnational crime, of which terrorism is seen as one manifestation. The general term also includes drug-trafficking, people-trafficking, money laundering, piracy, international economic crime and cyber crime. However, terrorism receives special attention from ASEAN.

In the 1990s, the problem of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region became a serious one (Gunaratna,2002:129): there are now terrorist elements in Central Asia (Tajikistan and

Afghanistan), South Asia (Kashmir and Pakistan) and Southeast Asia (the Philippines and Indonesia). Thus, there arose a threat potential within as well as outside the region. Within the region there are foreign groups such as the Islamist Sunni, as well as indigenous, ethno-nationalist groups. The Southeast Asian region has had to deal with a number of security issues since the end of the Cold War, terrorism being only one: other are crime, the drug trade, piracy, ethno-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, migration and refugees, and the trade in small arms. At the beginning of the third millennium piracy posed one of the biggest problems; it is of special interest as pirates can collaborate with terrorists. Based on Frost that there were 189 pirate attacks in Southern Asian waters in 2003 alone (Beyer,2010:45).

In the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (ASEAN Secretariat 1997), terrorism is referred to issued at a conference held by the ministers of the interior in 1997. The exchange of information and the coordination of policies are specifically as important in reacting to crime and terrorism. The declaration showed that ASEAN was convinced regional cooperation was necessary in order to fight transnational crime effectively, and the document details a number of measures to be taken to that end:

- ❖ strengthening the obligation of member states to participate in regional crime-fighting activities;
- ❖ establishment of meeting of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime at least every two years, in order to coordinate the activities of the relevant organs (e.g. the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police, or ASEANPOL;
- ❖ agreements on mutual legal assistance, treaties, memoranda of understanding, and other such matters;
- ❖ establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime (ACOT) to coordinate regional attempts to fight crime and to engage in the exchange of critical information, harmonisation of policies and the coordination of operations;

- ❖ establishment of an ad-hoc expert group, which, with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat, would fulfil the following tasks in the years to come: to develop an ASEAN Action Plan on Transnational Crime; to develop plans for an institutional framework for Asean countries' cooperation in this field; and to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of ACOT;
- ❖ a request for each member state to name representatives and coordinators for cooperation;
- ❖ networking between the relevant national institutions;
- ❖ strengthening of member states' efforts in the fight against transnational crime, with the ASEAN Secretary-General requested to integrate this field into his working programme;
- ❖ the necessity of cooperation with other international institutions, such as the UN, and with intraregional organisations; and
- ❖ Strengthening of Secretariat resources, necessary to support the member states in their fight against transnational crime (ASEAN Secretariat 1997).

However, closer anti-terror co-operation among the ASEAN members and with outside partners still faces major hindrance, in specific differences in regard to the perception of the terrorist threat, the political will and the concrete methods to combat terrorism, and the different capabilities of the national military, policing, and law enforcement agencies (Almontre,2003:229; Dillon,2003; Emmers,2003:423-427; Pushpanathan,1999; Singh,2003:217).

3. The ASEAN Security Community

a. Pursuing the 'ASEAN Community'

Since the late 1990s, the ASEAN members have pursued efforts to renew their commitment to cooperation, inspired by factors including the adverse impact of the Asian financial crisis on many members from mid 1997 and the need to cooperate and compete effectively with

the rapidly rising economic power of China and also of India, whose large markets and low-cost labour have been highly attractive to foreign investors.

These efforts led to a major declaration at the ninth ASEAN summit meeting of heads of government, in Bali in 2002, which has become known as the 'Bali Concord II' (a reference back to ASEAN's first meeting of heads of government, in Bali in 1976). The adoption of the Bali Concord II can be seen as ushering in the fifth and latest phase in the Association's development. In this Concord, ASEAN declared that, 'For the sustainability of our region's economic development we affirmed the need for a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation'. To pursue ASEAN's goals, the members declared that:

An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region (Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, 2003).

The Bali Concord II declaration also reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to enhance 'economic linkage with the world economy', ASEAN competitiveness and a favourable investment environment, and adherence to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a functioning and effective code of conduct for the region (Solingen, 2005:20). ASEAN has since made some important efforts to try to follow up these commitments.

b. The 'ASEAN Security Community'

In parallel with its pursuit of economic integration, ASEAN since the late 1990s has been seeking to bolster its own role and sense of direction to advance regional security. The ASEAN members have continued to face some difficult security issues, including ongoing inter-state conflicts, the problems created by the stubborn and dictatorial regime in Myanmar (which has had a substantial impact on Thailand, including the presence of several hundred thousand refugees) and the challenges posed by Islamic-based separatist movements and

terrorism. To reaffirm its role as a force for stability and security in Southeast Asia, ASEAN decided in 2003 to develop the concept of an 'ASEAN Security Community' (which has been referred to since 2007 as the 'ASEAN Political-Security Community', APSC)³.

The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) concept was initiated by Indonesia and adopted as part of the 'Bali Concord II' in October 2003. The ASC was meant to be an evolutionary concept rather than one which seeks a sharp change or departure in ASEAN practices. ASEAN's central aim from its outset was to help the members achieve a secure environment to increase prospects for internal stability and economic progress. The many years of meetings and discussions have been designed to a major degree to build up communication and enhance trust. It can be argued, then, that encouraging a sense of regional security has always been at the centre of ASEAN's concerns and that the Political-Security Community is an extension of this role. ASEAN has issued some guidelines for purposes for this Community but a detailed 'blueprint' has not yet been finalised: this is expected to be endorsed at the Summit in Bangkok in December 2008.

c. Change of Security

In the 1970s and 1980s, much of ASEAN's focus on security was directed towards challenges from outside the member countries: the implications of the end of the wars in Indochina, the movement of large numbers of refugees and the dispute over Cambodja.

Furthermore, ASEAN is a regional project which represents two waves of regionalism in the same project of regionalization. The first wave of regionalism, the old regionalism, emerged in the shape of the ASEAN during the Cold War. This organization was founded as the result of the bipolar tension as five original members of the Association⁴ tried to reduce the negative impact of the Cold War to regional stability as well as avoiding war among them

³ The proposal has since 2007 been referred to in ASEAN official statements as the 'ASEAN Political-Security Community', although the original term 'ASEAN Security Community' is still used in some ASEAN documents.

⁴ Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines

by managing their conflicts cooperatively and peacefully. Even though ASEAN had avoided applying the word security in its framework of cooperation, however, the primary aim of this organization was security, as the Bangkok Declaration specifies it in terms of peace and stability. ASEAN during the Cold War was a bulwark against communism. By quoting Leifer (1989): "The ostensible purpose of establishing ASEAN was to promote economic, social, and cultural co-operation but *regional securit was the prime occupation of its founder*".

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was the phenomenon of the new regionalism in the form of ASEAN. The idea of security remains at the heart of ASEAN. A marked difference ASEAN in the old and new forms of regionalism from the idea of regional cooperation, particularly concerning the conception of security which is combined with the emergence of some important events in the post-Cold War period.

The first method to distinguish recent development in the regional project within ASEAN is by examining the change of the notion of security in the region which has shifted from a realist tradition of defining security in the military term to a broader understanding of security as a wide spectrum which also includes non-traditional security issues (Dosch,2003). The end of the Cold War has also prompted a new discourse on the traditional view of security within ASEAN, with a new stress on incorporating economic, societal, and environmental dimensions of security into its agenda. There are various non-traditional security issues that take up the agenda of regional security as follows: intra-state and ethnic conflicts; transnational crimes which consist of issues such as terrorism, maritime piracy, arms smuggling, people smuggling, and illicit issues such as terrorism, maritime piracy, arms smuggling, people smuggling, and illicit drug trafficking; economic instability and poverty; transnational diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS, SARS, and the Avian flu); political transformations, in relations with the issue of human rights, democracy, and good governance; and environmental degradation and natural disaster.

The second method is by analyzing the shift of the diplomatic pattern from an informal and consensus-based way of managing security into a more open and explicit discourse. The so-called ASEAN Way of informal and consensus-based method describes how ASEAN member state develop a set of ideas, norms, and practices which effectively hide the security agenda behind the facade of low politics issues like economic and social cooperation, and styled of decision-making based on norm non-intervention.

As just noted, the style of cooperation and handling issues within ASEAN is commonly called the “ASEAN Way”. Kusumohamidjojo (2002) mentions at least three principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’:

emphasis on the principle of non-interference in other states internal affairs (self-restraint); (2) preference for consensus and non-binding plans (in conflict resolution) rather than treaties or legalistic rules ('understated' respect for the other members); (3) reliance on national institutional and actions and consideration for each other's interests and sensitivities, rather than creating a strong central bureaucracy of the ASEAN (joint responsibility).

According to Collin (2000), these norms have encouraged ASEAN members to negotiate their problems between friends and not opponents.

In the aftermath of the Asian financial crises and the 9/11, reforms have been attempted to accelerate the regional project with the recent changes. For example, Thailand's approach of “flexible engagement” on Myanmar in July 1998 which was based on an argument that embracing it into ASEAN multilateralism instead of confronting against its military regime would influence domestic change in the country (Katsumata,2004:243; Hund,2001:13; and Nischalke,2000:102).

4. ASEAN and Counter-Terrorism

The attack of 11 September 2001 shocked not only the USA, but also the rest of the world, including Southeast Asian Countries. For instance, Singapore strongly supported the USA in its declaration of war against terrorism from early on. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong stated

that Singapore would join the USA in the GWOT (Global War on Terrorism). Furthermore, Prime Minister Mahatir of Malaysia condemned the attacks. In addition, Indonesia's President Megawati Soekarnoputri visited the US a week after the 11 September 2001 attack as the first head of state to visit the USA; representing very strong gesture of support, given that her country has the world's largest Muslim population. Megawati rejected the attacks and supported the GWOT. Generally, the ASEAN states condemned the 9/11 attacks and supported the GWOT. In November 2001, ASEAN issued a common declaration to condemn terrorism and to work together in the fight against it (Chow,2005).

Empirically, this study is based on an analysis of the securitisation of terrorism under ASC since Bali bombing 2002. The securitisation process consists not only of ASEAN's 'speech acts', e.g. the Association's counter-terrorism declaration and the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN,2007), but of its concrete counter-terrorism policies as well.

Since the Bali bombings in 2002, ASEAN's process of strengthening regional counter-terrorism collaboration has become more structured and formalised. The organisation held a series of ministerial, senior diplomat, and other expert meetings to encourage transnational co-operation. In this regard, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), consisting of the ministers of the interior, the chiefs of police and drug experts, played a crucial steering role.

Politically, ASEAN has since 2002 concentrated on establishing a regional, legally based framework to harmonise the national counter-terrorism laws as base for bilateral and minilateral co-operation (Millar, Rosand, & Ipe,2007:8; Nathan,2003:256; Ong,2007:19; Rose & Nestorovska,2005:167). The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, have in 2002 agreed to upgrade their anti-terrorism collaboration and increase intelligence sharing; in 2003, Thailand, Cambodja, and Brunei joined this mechanism (Acharya & Acharya,2007:83-84; Dillon,2003).

In addition, this region need for increased confidence-building and a further depoliticisation of national counter-terrorism policies (Wright-Neville,2003:6). An instance, Singapore and Indonesia deal with the spread of so-called “wrong ideologies” or a “distorted view of Islam” (Allard,2009). Role models for the re-education of terrorists that ASEAN proposes are Singapore and Indonesia, which have implemented correction and re-education programs in both countries, civil society organisations play a strong role in engaging convicted terrorists and their families and communities in a broad dialogue that also includes communal and spiritual leaders (Azra,2003:53-55; Jones,2009).

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