

Policing The Police in Malaysia: Comparative Views

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Abstract

Integrity is a key factor in determining the success and progress of a country. Emphasis on integrity has become the government's main agenda. Enforcement agencies are the forerunners of the community service delivery system and ensure that the public is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. However, enforcement agencies are also identified as vulnerable and high-risk agencies to engage in the wrongdoings, abuse of power and corruption. In Malaysia, the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission is responsible to oversee and enforce integrity complaint against 21 enforcement agencies. In Australia, the enforcement integrity commission called Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity is responsible for regulating five enforcement agencies including the Australian Federal Police but only focuses on corruption practices. While in Hong Kong, Independent Police Complaints Council plays the role of monitoring police force and involve the investigation of all complaints against the police. Therefore, this article aims to see the effectiveness of the integrity commission through the number of complaints and investigations recorded. Accordingly, a comparison has been made to the three integrity commissions involved in respective countries. This article adopts a doctrinal research methodology which mainly library research that adopting secondary sources. This article finds that in other jurisdictions, most complaints of abuse by enforcement agencies are investigated by the agencies themselves; while in some jurisdictions, the supervisory commissions only act in the cases that involving serious misconduct. Also, the article finds that the commissions in these jurisdictions only

have supervisory power in. advising the enforcement agencies to take disciplinary action against the wrongdoers. The role of enforcement agency as such is wider as compared to their peers in other jurisdictions.

Keywords: Integrity, Corruption, Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC), Enforcement Agency, Police.

Introduction

Integrity is a universal issue that is important in bringing and sustaining the success and progress of a country. Any society with integrity is believed to adopt a healthy work ethic and lifestyle where individuals with integrity will carry out their responsibilities with honesty and trust. In the public sector, the spectrum of integrity and anti-corruption are inter-connected and related each other. According to [Widāng and Fridlund, \[1\]](#) one of the most important concepts in ethical reasoning is integrity due to its close linkage with the formation and strengthening of ethics [\[2\]](#) and to doing the right thing [\[3\]](#). Generally, integrity is defined as “the belief in one’s commitment and ability” to maintain one’s morals without compromise [\[4\]](#). Integrity also describes the behaviour and the success of employees in the workplace whereby fairness, honesty and trustworthiness are important elements to be practiced [\[5\]](#). In the case of public sector, in particular, the enforcement agencies like police force, police integrity refers to normative protections that the police do not misuse their powers, abuse their rights or privileges so as to ensure that the police are responsible for their actions and wrongdoings while keeping them to always be in the right direction [\[6\]](#).

Public sector including the enforcement agencies are not just viewed by the community with respect and dignity but also with fear and scepticism. The risk of breach of integrity such as corrupt practices among law enforcement members is very high. This has brought challenges in policing them. It is the fact that the enforcement agencies are vested with great power; power that is open to abuse [\[7\]](#). Realising this, most countries are having the independent body as a watchdog and to hear complaints, handle misconducts as well as tackle fraudulent activities and corruptions of the enforcement agencies. In the case of Australia, the establishment of the integrity commission as an overarching body function for the supervision of corruption and integrity in every area of federal public administration [\[8\]](#). The same goes with the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC) of Malaysia that since 2011, has aspired to strengthen, inculcate, and enhance integrity of the enforcement agencies, and also to increase public confidence in them. Some other countries also have this kind of special bodies or commissions that engage with integrity matters such as Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) that has been set up to handle complaints made against police forces in the United Kingdom. In Hong Kong, there is the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC-HK) to investigate all misconduct or complaints that involve the police force. In other words, although different countries take diverse approaches and initiatives, the goal and function of this specialised integrity body is to safeguard integrity and combat corruption so as to gain public trust towards the public sector. The question, therefore, is there any difference between the integrity commissions of Malaysia, Hong Kong and Australia, in term of visibility and efficiency, in performing their roles and functions in policing the police?

This article aims to examine the effectiveness of the integrity commission by considering the number of complaints and investigations recorded in three countries namely Malaysia, Australia and Hong Kong. While Australia is found to be effective in

tackling corrupt activities and good governance in western democracies, Hong Kong is recognised internationally for a success story in combating corruption in police force. Therefore, while looking at the different views and approaches of the integrity commissions of these countries, some lessons could be learnt to improve the aspect of integrity among the enforcement agencies, in particular police force.

Method

This article applies the doctrinal research methods which are largely documentary. A doctrinal research methodology is a study that focuses on statutory laws, legal documents and reports [9,10]. From the documents, then the article deploying a deductive form of legal reasoning which is a classic form of doctrinal research method. To put it simply, doctrinal research is research which defines what the law in a particular area is. In doing so, the researcher collects, compare and analyses the data from primary and secondary sources [11]. Then, the data is analysed, compared and discussed.

It is important to note that, while the integrity commission of Malaysia, called the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission, is overseeing 21 enforcement agencies, Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity is responsible towards five enforcement agencies while in Hong Kong, the Independent Police Complaints Council monitors only one, namely the police force. The statistics of complaint and investigation of the countries could be indicating how effective each commissions function particularly when there is significant different of the number of enforcement agencies monitored by the integrity commissions in each country. It is to note that, although Hong Kong used council, the word commission that is used refers to the integrity bodies that oversee and supervise the enforcement agencies including police.

Literature review

Ariffin and Ahmad [12] divide integrity into two types, individual and organizational integrity. Individual integrity is a set of superior qualities in individuals, these qualities are in accordance with the principle of high morality. In other words, actions, ethics, moral and legal principles are in harmony with integrity and aligned between self and public interest. While organizational integrity refers to the code of ethics, charters, system, work processes and best practices within the organization that are formulated and implemented accordingly. These codes of ethics becoming a norm and corporate culture of the organization due to its consistent adherence and implementation. Eventually, if the workers of an organization have high integrity, then organizational integrity will also increase. In the Hong Kong Police Force, integrity is defined as the qualities of uprightness, soundness and honesty. Police integrity refers to the demonstration of these qualities where they apply to police work. They are the most basic and fundamental qualities required of any police officer when he discharges his duty and are necessary to maintain confidence in the Force.

Integrity is important for the development, success and sustainability of any countries. Recognising that integrity is 'cancerous' in Malaysia, the government introduced the National Integrity Plan 2004 [13]. The definition of integrity has been described neatly in the NIP 2004, which implies the highest quality of meaning that exists in the whole and at the heart of individuals and organizations where it is based on strong principles of honesty and morality [14]. The objective is in line with the fourth challenge of Vision 2020, "to build a society that is strong in its moral and ethical character, with its citizens of great religious and spiritual value, and supported by high moral values". This clearly

demonstrates the importance of integrity in community to ensure the stability of the country. Under the NIP, one of the factors that undermined the proposed philosophy was corruption among the public servants. The practice of corruption is a major offence in the administration, especially for government agencies. Thus, the values and ethics of the public service are published to serve as a guide, reference and source for public service personnel.

According to Head [15], related institutional arrangements are needed to provide reinforcement for the independent work. In this respect, integrity agencies work best in those democratic countries where accountability and transparency are well incorporated in public sector systems and where political leadership is concerned to support these values. Prenzler and Faulkner [16] argued that anticorruption commissions are essential to ensure the integrity of the public sector and that a model commission should cover all elements of the public sector; independently investigate serious and midlevel complaints; have own motion powers to investigate any matter; have summary authority to apply administrative sanctions; make use of a range of investigative tools; not be tasked with combating major and organised crime; and be held accountable to citizens through a parliamentary committee and a parliamentary inspector.

Findings

Malaysia's Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC)

The implementation of integrity among law enforcement members and enforcement agencies was noted by the government through the establishment of the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC). In essence, the EAIC was formed to replace the initial proposal of the Independent Police Complaints and Abuse Commission (IPCMC) proposed by the Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia Police specifically to deal with complaints of misconduct by members and officers of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). However, the government has found that it is more beneficial for the Commission to not only focus on the misconduct of its members and police officers but also on enforcement officers and federal enforcement agencies. Accordingly, the Parliament has passed the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission Act 2009 (Act 700) in lieu of the Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC) Bill, that was gazetted on September 3, 2009, and subsequently and formally established the Commission on April 1, 2011.

The existence of the EAIC has opened up an alternative channel for the public to report and complain if they have evidence that enforcement officers or enforcement agencies are involved in misconduct activities. Prior to the establishment of the EAIC, complaints and misconduct information to enforcement officers or enforcement agencies were made through existing traditional channels such as the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) or the Public Complaints Bureau (BPA) in the Prime Minister's Department and the disciplinary division of enforcement agencies. In addition, the EAIC is also mandated to formulate legislation, recommend improvement of administrative procedures and procedures in promoting integrity among its regulatory agencies. Thus, the objective of establishing the EAIC is not to find fault or to expose the shame of the enforcement officers and enforcement agencies, but rather as a medium to assist the enforcement agencies in enhancing integrity and accountability as well as improving their services in the country. Thus, the main role of EAIC is receiving complaints from the public against the enforcement officers involving 21 enforcement agencies and to investigate the matter as regulated under the Schedule 700 Act, and this shall include the police force or Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) [17].

In pursuant to Section 23 (4) of Act 700, all misconduct complaints received by the

EAIC are evaluated by the Complaints Committee (JKA) for consideration as to whether those complaints fall within the scope of the misconduct that can be investigated by the EAIC as stated in section 24 of the Act. For that purpose, a preliminary investigation under section 25 is conducted for the purpose of obtaining further information in order to determine the type of misconduct complained of and whether the EAIC should proceed with a full investigation into the complaint. At the initial stage, an investigation is conducted to assess the complaint, while at the full investigation stage, a detailed investigation is conducted to identify misconduct and the individuals involved. A full investigation is commenced if the complaint discloses an offence (Section 24). The complaint however will be dismissed if the conduct complained of is not within the scope of the misconduct specified in section 24 or it is trivial, inconvenient, and not made in good faith.

The results of the full investigation with recommendations will be tabled at the Commission Meeting for consideration by the Commission as per the provisions of section 30 (1). If the complaint cannot be confirmed or the misconduct is a disciplinary offence, they may be referred to local authorities with the recommendation of punishment; and if the complaint is a criminal offence, it will be recommended to be referred to the Public Prosecutor. Table 1 summarizes the total number of complaints and the number of investigation papers registered against RMP from 2015 to June 26, 2020.

Table 1

Total complaints and Investigation Papers of RMP from 2015 until June 2020

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Number of Complaints	218	306	440	477	742	309	3203
Number of Investigation Papers	86	88	112	166	167	0	790

Source: <http://www.eaic.gov.my/pusat-sumber/statistik/aduan>

Hong Kong's Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC-HK)

Hong Kong has taken the step to tackle the issue of public complaint against the police and to enhance the integrity of the police force by setting up an independent integrity council known as the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) (United Nations, 2011). IPCC was established under the Independent Police Complaints Council Ordinance (IPCCO) (Cap. 604, Laws of Hong Kong) on June 1st, 2009. In the 2019 report, Independent Police Complaints Council (2019) stated that IPCC's members are civilian including Chairman and three Vice-Chairman. The members come from various background of the society like legal, medical, economy, social welfare as well as Legislative Council Members. As of 1 January 2020, there are 26 members of IPCC. This diverse background and composition of the members enable IPCC to monitor the investigation carried out by the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO) to be impartial and independent [21].

IPCC plays an important role to observe, monitor and review on how the reports against the police force being handled and investigated by the Commissioner of Police. Then the IPCC may identify and recommend for improvement any gap or weakness in the handling and investigation of the complaint. It is worth to note that IPCC themselves do not receive or investigate complaints. The IPCC just monitor and review the handling of the public complaint against the police of Hong Kong. The police departments themselves who handle the public complaint while the IPCC is monitoring and reviewing them (the police department handling the complaint). IPCC also ensures that both parties i.e. the

complainant and the police are treated fairly and justly by having standardised procedures. Serious misconduct or wrongdoings by police are within the purview of the Internal Investigation Office of the police to investigate. The investigation by the Internal Investigation Office is carried out under the supervision of the Independent Commission against Corruption, which is also investigating its own case [6,18]. All decisions have to be made based on the evidence presented and the relevant applicable law (Independent Police Complaints Council, 2020).

Furthermore, there is a two-tier complaint system against the police to ensure impartiality and fairness. The first one is where the complaint by the public is handled by Complaint Against Police Office (CAPO). CAPO is the office who do the investigation and to prepare and complete the investigation paper, together with relevant evidence. The completed investigation paper then submitted to IPCC. Secondly, the IPCC reviews the investigation report and deciding whether IPCC agrees that the complaint has been properly addressed by the police. However, if IPCC in the opinion that the investigation is incomplete, dissatisfy or need further information on the investigation by the CAPO, IPCC may request CAPO to redo or to further investigate the matter to their satisfaction. As such, IPCC act as 'endorser' to the investigation by the police on the report made against the police and at the same is an independent body which may give opinion or suggestion for improvement to the Commissioner of Police [19]. Table 2 below indicates the number of investigation reports and allegations based on a number of Reportable Complaints cases received and endorsed.

Table 2
Number of reportable complaints cases received and endorsed

Year	2018/2019	2017/2018
Reportable Complaint cases received	1521	1616
Reportable Complaint cases endorsed	1527	1617

Source: https://www.ipcc.gov.hk/en/publications/annual_report/2018.html

Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI)

An enforcement integrity commission in Australia is called the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), that was established in 2006 by the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006. Since its inception, ACLEI's jurisdiction and resources have grown exponentially. In regards to the organizational structure, it is headed by the Integrity Commissioner, and have few departments like the Operations branch and Secretariat branch. It is the role of ACLEI to support the Integrity Commissioner and to provide independent assurance to the government about the integrity of prescribed law enforcement agencies and their staff members. There are a few numbers of agencies within the jurisdiction of ACLEI namely the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the Department of Home Affairs including the Australian Border Force and any other Australian Government agency that is prescribed by the regulation under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.

ACLEI is statutorily empowered and authorised to conduct hearings for the purpose of gathering information, issue notices to produce evidence, conduct integrity test, intercept data access and telecommunications, to do surveillance electronically or physically, enforce search warrants and scrutinise financial records. In addition, ACLEI

also has the power to investigate report on corruption against those agencies where the Integrity Commissioner will appoint experts to do the investigation (Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity). Its role is overseeing the corruption-related cases within the enforcement agencies, where the main focus is more on serious and systemic corruption. The Integrity Commissioner who heads ACLEI will consider all the reports regarding corruption involving the enforcement agencies and other government agencies which have enforcement power. Based on these reports, collected and gathered by ACLEI, the Integrity Commissioner then produce an annual report, reporting the trends, patterns and related matters on the prevalence of corruption in Australia.

ACLEI also aims to understand corrupt practices and to prevent them. Information on corruption is received from the public, members of law enforcement agencies, as well as investigative initiatives from ACLEI itself. Heads of agencies within the jurisdiction of ACLEI are responsible to report to the Integrity Commissioner of any corruption cases within their agencies. Upon any information received by ACLEI or Integrity Commissioner that corruption has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, the investigation may be conducted by Integrity Commissioner. In carrying out its role, the Integrity Commissioner needs to identify the weaknesses or practices that lead to the problem of corruption as well as the problem of failure to detect the problem earlier before its occurrence. The identification practices or loopholes that create the risk of corruption will then be reported by Integrity Commissioner to the government agencies for recommendation to fill the gap and to lower the risk [20].

Table 3 below shows the total number of ACLEI investigations, including joint investigations that commenced and concluded since 2014 until 2019 against five agencies including Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Australian Federal Police (AFP), AUSTRAC, Department of Home Affairs and Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment.

Table 3

Corruption issues investigated by ACLEI (including joint investigations)

Corruption issues investigated	2014–15	2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2018–19
Total active in the year	75	144	242	282	252
Number commenced	42	76	107	55	28
Number concluded	7	8	14	52	116

Source: <https://www.transparency.gov.au/annual-reports/australian-commission-law-enforcement-integrity/reporting-year/2018-2019-20#hc0933a35-c73b-5617-93f3-240ccdfc8c82>

Table 4

Number of Investigation and Completed Investigation Against AFP

Year	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	Total
Number of Investigation	54	93	98	33	278
Number of Completed Investigation	1	26	16	46	89

Source: <https://www.transparency.gov.au/annual-reports/australian-commission-law-enforcement-integrity/reporting-year/2018-2019-20#hc0933a35-c73b-5617-93f3-240ccdfc8c82>

Discussion

Functions

Looking at the integrity commissions in these three jurisdictions, the roles and functions of the EAIC of Malaysia found to be wider in the sense that it oversees 21 enforcement agencies and do not focus on the police force alone. Having this wide and variety of roles involving other enforcement agencies may probably affect its efficiency and effectiveness in regard to monitoring and conducting investigations on the public complaints towards the police force and its officers. This is contradicting with the counterpart of IPCC Hong Kong that focuses in tackling the complaints and misconduct issues of the police force only. The same goes with the ACLEI, though wider as compared to IPCC, it is limited to five enforcement agencies only that inclusive of the police. On this point, probably the recommendation of having a special integrity body to monitor the conducts and complaints against the RMP of Malaysia should be workable for a more effective enforcement and function of the specialised integrity body.

Number of Complaints

Looking at Table 1 above, in Malaysia, the number of complaints of misconduct by enforcement officers or enforcement agencies increases each year, especially in 2015 (307 complaints), 2016 (445 complaints), 2017 (546 complaints), 2018 (551 complaints)) and 2019 (970 complaints). Based on the number of complaints and investigation papers from 2015 to June 2020, misconduct by members and police officers recorded the highest number of complaints and investigations each year. It is concluded that there is an increase in the total number of complaints and the number of Investigation Papers against RMP every year. This increasing in terms of power abuse among police forces has sparked a debate on the role of the EAIC in overseeing police officers. This has led to the demand for IPCMC to be revived to replace EAIC in the effort to monitor the police force alone as compared to other enforcement agencies [7]. Additionally, several countries have set up specialized police bodies such as police agencies, police service commissions and independent police complaints bodies to investigate complaints of misconduct among police.

While in Hong Kong, referring to Table 2 above, the number of reportable complaint cases received in 2018/19 decreased by 5.9% when compared to the previous year. IPCC also endorsed 1527 investigations by CAPO in 2018/19 and 1617 in 2017/18. According to IPCC, the most common complaints against the police was the allegation of "neglect of duty", followed by "misconduct/improper manner/offensive language" and then "assault". In regard to time taken to complete the investigation, IPCC highlighted that it depends on the complexity of the cases and whether or not the completed investigation is to the satisfaction of IPCC-HK. A complaint which is considered as "petty issues" will be categorised and handled via "Informal Resolution", while serious complaints and more complex conducts that requires full investigation will be categorised as such by CAPO and handled accordingly. IPCC reveals that in regard to cases in 2018/19, CAPO took on average 78 days to complete the investigation as compared to 96 days taken in 2017/18. In other words, CAPO has shortened the days taken to complete the investigation.

In addition, section 9 of IPCCO provides for the requirement of CAPO to submit a summary of Notifiable Complaint to IPCC for review. CAPO has to justify the reason for categorising the complaint as Notifiable Complaint. It is worth to note that "notifiable complaint", as the name suggests, only requires CAPO to 'notify' IPCC without having to do a full investigation. Upon receiving the summary of the Notifiable Complaint from

CAPO, IPCC may reclassify the complaint as "Reportable Complaint", for CAPO to take further action. In 2018/19, IPCC reviewed 617 of Notifiable Complaint submitted by CAPO. In regard to public accessibility and awareness to the complaint system, several channels introduced by IPCC, whereby the public may give, express and convey their opinion. The effort by IPCC generated 8,041 public inquiries in the year 2018/19 [21].

In Australia, Table 3 indicated that between 2014 to 2017, the number of the commencement of cases investigated by ACLEI is more than the concluded cases, except in the year 2018-19. In 2016-17, a total of 242 investigations on corruption-related cases were recorded, of which 107 investigations commenced and only 14 of them were successfully concluded (5.8%). Based on this duration of concluded investigations, it is expected that ACLEI will need another 16 years to complete the remaining 228 investigations. The number of carried forward investigation also increased from 118 in 2014 to 336 as of June 2017. Apart from that, in 2017-18, a total of 282 investigations were recorded. Out of that number, 55 investigations on corruption issues commenced, and 52 corruption issues were concluded (18.4%). In 2018-19, ACLEI investigates 252 corruption issues, 28 investigations commenced, and 116 corruption issues successfully concluded (46.0%). This statistical indicates that ACLEI performed well or strongly against its performance measures in 2018-19.

Also, between 2014-15 and 2016-17, the analysis by Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)(2018) found that the comparator agencies (Victoria's Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC), Western Australia's Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC), New South Wales' Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and New South Wales' Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC)) started 126 investigations of which 120 were successfully concluded (ratio 0.95). Instead, ACLEI initiated 225 investigations of which only 31 were concluded (0.14 ratio). This analysis shows that ACLEI is less efficient in concluding investigations than the other four agencies (IBAC, CCC, ICAC and LECC). However, from the previous ten months to April 30, 2018, ACLEI ratio increased to 0.67. While this is a significant increase based on the previous three-year ratio, this indicates that the volume of ACLEI open research continues to increase during 2017-18.

To enhance the efficiency of the investigation, an agreement between the AFP was made in May 2016, which allow the AFP to investigate allegations of corruption while informing the Integrity Commissioner about the allegations. Similarly, another agreement was signed in March 2018 between ACLEI and Home Department. The signed agreements help to increase the efficiency in case management whereby it allows the enforcement agencies to continue with the investigation while waiting for the decision of Integrity Commissioner (Australian National Audit Office, 2018). Based on the ACLEI's annual report (2018), the highest number of internal investigations in 2018-19 were conducted by the Department of Home Affairs and AFP, representing about 45% of the total investigations. Table 4 present the number of total corruption issues active in the year and number of the investigation completed since 2015-16 against AFP.

Then, the authors compare the roles of the Commissions in Malaysia, HK and Australia. In Malaysia, EAIC acts as the Commission that responsible for receiving complaints from the public and investigating cases of misconduct against enforcement officers involving 21 enforcement agencies, including police force (RMP). As in Australia, ACLEI is responsible for regulating five enforcement agencies including the AFP but only focuses on corruption practices. In Hong Kong, IPCC-HK also play the role in monitoring police force but involve the investigations of all police complaints. Table 5 summarizes the comparisons between the integrity enforcement agencies discussed in this article.

Table 5

Comparisons of Roles Between the Integrity Enforcement Agencies

Country	Malaysia	Hong Kong	Australia
Implementing agency/ commissions	EAIC	IPCC	ACLEI
Number of Regulatory Agencies	21 enforcement agencies (including RMP)	1 agency (Police force)	5 enforcement agencies (including AFP)
Enforcement of the Act	Law Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission Act 2009 (Act 700)	Independent Police Complaints Council Ordinance (IPCCO) (Cap. 604, Laws of HK)	Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006
Type of Complaint / Investigation	Investigate all misconduct complaints	Investigate all police complaints	Focus on corruption practices
Power/ authority	Receive and investigates the complaints	observe, monitor and review the work of CAPO (investigations into Reportable Complaint)	Detecting investigates and prevent the corrupt conduct
Number of Complaints/ Investigation (year)	3203 (2015-2020)	3137 (2017/18 – 2018/19)	278 (2015/16 – 2018/19)
Number of Investigation/ Endorsed/Completed (year)	790 (2015-2020)	3144 (2017/18 – 2018/19)	89 (2015/16 – 2018/19)

The results of previous studies found that the number of public complaints closely related to the level of integrity of law enforcement personnel, especially among the police force. The higher number of complaints received indicates the deterioration of the level of integrity [22]. Based on relative facts, it can be concluded that the EAIC is a powerful Commission in monitoring integrity among enforcement agencies including the police force. This is reflected in comparisons between the EAIC and several international integrity monitoring bodies such as the United Kingdoms of IPCC/IOPC, IPCC in Hong Kong and ACLEI in Australia. It can be observed that in international practice, most complaints of misconduct against the police should be investigated by the police themselves while the supervisory body only observes and sometimes monitors the investigation. Only in cases of serious misconduct, the IPCC and ACLEI will conduct their own investigation (IPCC HK does not have that authority). As the investigating body, the three supervisory bodies do not act as arbitrators in sentencing. They will only have the ability of counsellors to take disciplinary action. Furthermore, unlike the EAIC, none of them seems to have the power

to initiate an investigation against the police unless a report is made [7]. As highlighted by Rahim [23], EAIC should be seen as a medium to assist law enforcement agencies in enhancing integrity and enhancing the accountability and service accountability of law enforcement agencies in the country.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, a good practice of “policing the police” is “policing” that is both effective and fair. In order to police effectively and fairly, public cooperation is highly required. In a similar vein, enhancing the police integrity is primarily meant to establish, restore or enhance public trust and rebuild the legitimacy that is a prerequisite for effective policing [6]. Public trust and confidence towards enforcement agencies including the police heavily depends on the effectiveness, legitimacy and fairness of the agencies in protecting the community against crimes. Good policing is policing with legitimacy on the basis of public consent, rather than repression [24].

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