

Dissecting the Attitudes of Political Science Students Towards Democracy and the 2004 Elections in Indonesia

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Students' attitudes towards Indonesia's transition from an authoritarian era to democracy varied from strong support for the democratic transition to nostalgia for the authoritarian era's strong leadership and economic prosperity. A sample of 317 students from three Indonesian universities was asked to rate the importance of political, economic, legal and social democratic principles. In addition to concerns about corruption, economic decline and security, students differed significantly centring on the importance of legitimate elections, representation, tolerance, accountability, human rights and gender equality. The majority of students were pessimistic about the elections; paradoxically some students optimistic about the general elections rated democratic principles the least important. After discussing the implications, political attitudes about democracy and elections were related to cognitive consistency and dissonance theory.

Keywords: Democracy; Elections; Authoritarian; Corruption; Cognitive Dissonance

Introduction

Mainstream political literature has produced a comprehensive set of characteristics and norms defining democracy and associated processes, culminating in landmark works on the democratic audit and international framework for democratic assessment (Weir and Beetham, 1999). Drawing on the fundamental principles put forth in such works, attitude scales measuring public support for democracy are being applied in the context of nations in transition, the so-called emerging democracies of the developing world (Huntington, 1991). With specific regards to Indonesia, the recent political reform movement has enthusiastically adopted the

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language of democracy, as can be seen in the university curriculum, the discourse among activists, NGOs, government, and the mainstream media. The future of democracy in the world's largest Muslim country belongs to the attitudes of the youth, particularly their interpretation of political history, role of elections, and importance of democratic values in shaping contemporary Indonesian. This article will focus on how different interpretations of the transition from three decades of authoritarian rule under President Suharto to democracy in 1998 affect political science students' concerns about the 2004 national elections, and the degree of importance they attach to specific democratic principles.

Brief Political History

Independence for Indonesia in 1945, after three and a half centuries of Dutch colonial presence, found nationalist leaders faced with a largely illiterate population with limited bureaucratic or commercial experience and divided along ethnic and cultural lines (Ricklefs, 2001). Mobilizing a population in the world's largest archipelago towards a sense of national identity compatible with democracy was instilled by nationalist slogans such as '*bhinneka tunggal ika*' or unity in diversity, and *Pancasila* ingraining five central principles: belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice (Ramage, 1995). The uneasy political coalition forged by Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, was threatened as competing social forces, corruption, and capitalistic exploitation weakened public support for democracy. With little post-war economic recovery and incarceration of much of the opposition leadership, President Sukarno abrogated the constitution, appointed the legislature, and ended liberal democracy (von der Mehden, 2005).¹ By 1965 the delicate balancing act had unravelled and the leadership of Sukarno was undermined following an attempted coup and a national crisis. As Sukarno faced house arrest the country was plunged into violence as the anticommunist purges intensified,² leaving a gap which was quickly filled by General Suharto (Emmerson, 2004). Formal recognition of Suharto's presidency came in 1966 and for the next 32 years his rule was consolidated in what came to be known as the New Order era.

The New Order era was characterized by authoritarian rule, relative stability and economic growth, leading many Indonesians to look back sympathetically at this period of history. During these decades of strong leadership, modernization based on foreign investment spurred export revenues, per capita income rose, poverty declined, transportation improved along with communications, television and life expectancy (von der Mehden, 2005). Despite economic and social growth, problems with corruption were epidemic, elections were not free or representative, political accountability was low, and the military was an agent to enforce social policy. In spite of these problems, there still exists a degree of nostalgia for the New Order in Indonesia due to its perceived political and economic stability, as well as security from communal violence, terrorism and lawlessness (Emmerson, 2004).

The transition in 1998 which was precipitated by the Asian financial crisis saw the Suharto regime collapse, giving way to the '*Era Reformasi*' (reform era) which in turn led to open elections in 1999.³ Amongst the many trigger effects leading to this transition were persistent student protests held throughout the archipelago, most heavily concentrated in the capital Jakarta. Vocal and often dramatic student protestors paralysed traffic along the central thoroughfares of Jakarta, and university campuses were transformed into forums of non-violent activism where student leaders demanded radical reforms.⁴ The Trisakti campus shootings resulting in the death of four students on 12 May 1998 only served to solidify the opposition to Suharto's military backed regime (Webber, 2006). Just nine days later, on 21 May 1998, Suharto formalized his resignation and public expectations began to run dangerously high as the era of democratization was ushered in (McRae, 1999).

On 7 June 1999 the Republic of Indonesia held its first free elections for the national legislature since 1955, but it resulted in political fragmentation as elected members divided into six major parties and 17 minor parties (Carter Center, 1999). Since no party had a majority, the indirect determination of Indonesia's president led to factional infighting and uncertainty. This was temporarily resolved through political manoeuvring at the elite level, and compromises were reached with members of the security apparatus as well as with Islamic parties, eventually bringing Abdurrahman Wahid to power. He had been a proponent of liberal democracy and religious tolerance, but within two years Wahid was forced to resign due to claims of ill health as well as impeachment charges (von der Mehden, 2005). A special session held by the National Assembly on 23 July 2001 formalized the removal of Wahid, paving the way for the presidency of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president Sukarno. Her strengths were neither in parliamentary skills nor policy initiatives, but her cautious approach enabled her to stay in power and Megawati soon became a symbol of opposition to the legacy of Suharto's New Order (Thalang, 2005).

In spite of this, by 2003 surveys conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute found that most voters judged the New Order system to have been better than the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (Qodari, 2005). Faculty from Gajah Mada University in Central Java reinforced the findings of this survey by stating that their students may be suffering from 'collective amnesia' given the long struggle of their predecessors to have Suharto removed from power.⁵ The pre-transition nostalgia for the predictability and relative security of life under President Suharto became known as 'SARS' ('*Sendrom Amat Rindu Suharto*' or 'longing for Suharto syndrome') after the well-known epidemic disease (Qodari, 2005: 80).

In a climate of rising public dissatisfaction, the next substantive test for the *reformasi* period was the 2004 direct presidential election. Round one of the elections were held on 5 July, while the second and decisive round was held on 20 September. Hoping to capitalize on growing public discontent, Suharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (popularly known as Tutut), and former army chief of staff General Hartono, formed a new political party called the PKPB. Having been a

minister in her father's cabinet, Tutut wanted to capture the 2004 elections in order to restore the family's reputation and defend the New Order regime, although she never seriously challenged the other candidates (Webber, 2006). As discussed later, the unexpected partnership of candidates Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf Kalla triumphed in the end.

Amongst the various issues that arose during this time, this article will dissect how democratic principles are linked to different attitudes towards the New Order and importance of leadership in national elections. Those sympathetic with the New Order assert that strong and effective leadership was an advantage of authoritarian rule even though it historically sacrificed democratic principles and fair elections. Strong leadership is meant to translate into decisive governance, though for it to be compatible with democracy it must be coupled with accountability, transparency, participation, representation, as well as self-imposed limitations in order to avoid the excesses of corruption or maladministration.

In terms of ensuring that contemporary elections are both free and fair, the General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum—KPU*) has been entrusted with organizing, supervising, monitoring and overseeing all aspects of elections in Indonesia (Emmerson, 2004). As part of election reforms, an international presence consisting of independent monitoring commissions including academics and NGOs appointed by parliament, rather than government and party representatives, was designed to limit factors such as electoral manipulation, money politics and fraud. Despite such innovations, many contentious issues remain.

Contentious Electoral Issues in the Post-Transition Era

Advocates of democratization in Indonesia were quickly alerted to the possibility that Indonesia's newly reformed political system would fail to produce strong and effective leaders capable of consolidating their rule. Failure to address the country's multitude of problems, such as the need for unity in times of increasing separatism, would further undermine public confidence (Emmerson, 2004). The ongoing project of nation-building in Indonesia has been hindered by the diversity of the country, reflected in the emerging party system where a multitude of political parties are rooted in a variety of traditions, ideologies and beliefs, with potentially negative effects on forging national unity and democratic stability. Political exploitation of tensions between such groups tends to polarize the multiparty system, jeopardizing leadership coalitions and policy-related collaborations. Leaders often appear indecisive and overly cautious when faced with political opposition and lobbying from all directions, resulting in a tendency to seek out compromise while maintaining the status quo and slowing reform. Widespread disillusionment with post-Suharto leadership has been exacerbated by perceptions of ineffective economic reforms, rising levels of unemployment, and inept anti-corruption campaigns (Tan, 2002).

Political jockeying and divisions within the 48 registered political parties seemed to influence the selection of President Wahid by the legislature in 1999, eventually

leading to constitutional reforms and the direct presidential elections of 2004 (Qodari, 2005). Five sets of presidential and vice-presidential candidates were on the ballot in 2004, and if no pair managed to win 50% or more of the vote, there would be a runoff between the top two finishers. Many political scientists predicted that because this was the first direct presidential election held in Indonesia, it would result in factionalism, instability and policy-making paralysis in a multiparty parliament. In some ways this has been the case; however, since the direct elections of 2004 there have also been successes and the administration has proven capable of breaking the deadlock and undertaking difficult reforms that have been unpopular with the general public, such as the reduction of fuel subsidies in October 2005.⁶

Another contentious issue from the 2004 general elections was the degree to which elections were considered to be free and fair. Beginning with the positives, it appears that democratic reforms have reduced the political and social functions of the military and police, preventing them from selecting some of the members of the house, increased the accountability of legislators to their constituents, and ensuring that monitors of the 2004 elections would consist of members who did not have conflicts of interest (Qodari, 2005). With a complex series of three elections, the democratic system was tested like never before, with a roster of 148 million eligible voters choosing from 450,000 legislative candidates, competing for 16,000 legislative seats covering more than 12,000 islands spread across 10 million square kilometres. Just as in 1999, there was the prospect of rioting, provocation, and conflict between rival ethnic minorities and religious groups represented by 24 parties running for legislative seats which fortunately never materialized (Qodari, 2005). President Suharto during the New Order era only allowed three political parties, including his own Golkar Party, which has enjoyed continued support as illustrated by its capture of 22.4% of the popular vote after Suharto's removal from office and despite accusations of corruption, arrests of party members, instigations of violence, and Golkar's close association with the widely criticized military apparatus (Collins, 2002). Five years later, the well organized and deeply rooted Golkar Party still has considerable popular support within Indonesia's multiparty system. The party leader Jusuf Kalla, hailing from Sulawesi, is now Vice President and enjoys significant support in Eastern Indonesia. However, whether or not the continued influence of the Golkar Party translates into a threat to the democratization process has yet to be demonstrated.

Political Psychology

Political surveys measuring people's attitudes, beliefs and behaviours usually find an underlying cognitive consistency because they are derived from a coherent system of rational and emotional values. For example, Eysenck (1954), using a liberal-conservative scale, found those people who displayed strong liberal or conservative attitudes in one area will also tend to express a similar attitude in most of the other fields tested and were resistant to attitude change by political advertising,

propaganda, or other means. In this context, Indonesians who were positive about the transition from the New Order era to democracy would also tend to be optimistic about the 2004 elections. Furthermore, those who were negative about the political transition after President Suharto's downfall in 1998 would have similar pessimistic feelings about the 2004 democratic elections.

Modern theories have introduced a dual-process model of political reasoning where questions about beliefs are first quickly evaluated in terms of affect and the extent to which past experience can easily generate a coherent response (Lodge and Taber, 2005). Only when this relatively automatic process fails does the individual think about their response to the question, taking a fairly time consuming process of retrieving information from memory, considering alternatives, and deliberating the logical consequences. However, it could be argued that this automatic process occurs predominately in people who are not interested in political issues or rigidly hold to a doctrine based on faith (Jost and Hunyady, 2002).

Political sophistication is the process of gaining and ultimately possessing expertise in one or more domains of political thinking and it should lead to more rational weighting of information before making a decision (Lieberman *et al.*, 2001). Scholars in the field of politics tend to evaluate the congruency of the question with past experience and attitudes, taking more time to answer questions which presumably reflects more depth of processing. Empirical research has shown that people's prior political attitudes are quite resistant to change, especially among those who hold strong attitudes and they will actively bolster their position with counterarguments, scepticism, and rationalizations (Lodge and Taber, 2005). Incongruent information has been hypothesized to cause the person to feel uncomfortable and motivate them to change their attitudes, or re-evaluate their importance, or avoid the conflicting information using a variety of defence mechanisms.

Festinger (1957) elucidated his cognitive dissonance theory and posits that when a person's attitudes or beliefs are discrepant, physiological arousal results, leading to motivate the person to restore harmony. Once noticed, the discomfort is attributed to the discrepancy between the conflicting ideas and pressure mounts to reduce dissonance depending on their importance to the individual. In emerging democracies, attitude measures of democracy tend to be different than established democracies since opinions are expressed in light of direct experience with the old regime and its comparative performance.

The conceptual framework people have in mind for democracy will have common features in all democracies, but these features will be given very different levels of importance in different countries. For example, citizens in post-communistic countries may consider civil liberties and human rights very important, while in Asia or Latin America, legitimate elections and anti-corruption may be considered of greatest importance (Lagos, 2003). Nostalgia for Suharto's authoritarian era may conflict with liberal democracy and could produce dissonance to the degree that individuals value specific democratic principles.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Negative and Positive Developments (Table 1)

Indonesian political science students, listing the negative developments that have occurred since the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, will focus on economic decline, corruption and political instability. Students listing the positive developments since Indonesia's political transition to democracy will concentrate on civil liberties, electoral and political reforms. A questionnaire was used to measure the opinions of university students concerning this transitional point in Indonesian history using open- and closed-ended questions.

Hypothesis 2: Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy (Table 2)

Indonesian students studying politics with positive attitudes towards the political transition in 1998, ending more than three decades of rule under Suharto, will rate democratic principles as more important than individuals who are negative about the transition. Balanced for positive and negative affect, one question dealt with developments since the political transition in 1998 and a second question dealt with a comparison of the New Order and reform era.

Hypothesis 3: Indonesia's Reformed 2004 Electoral Process (Table 3)

Optimistic students who felt that pro-democratic reforms would result in free and fair elections as well as strong and effective leadership will rate democratic principles as more important than those respondents who were pessimistic towards the 2004 general elections. One survey question measured the optimism of politics students towards electing strong and effective leaders and another question dealt with whether they were optimistic that the elections would be free and fair.

Hypothesis 4: Cognitive Consistency between Transition and Elections (Table 4)

Indonesian students who were positive towards the transition from the authoritarian era to democracy and optimistic towards the elections will rate democratic principles more important than students negative about the transition and pessimistic towards the 2004 general elections.

Hypothesis 5: Cognitive Dissonance between Transition and Elections (Tables 5 and 6)

Ambivalent students who were positive towards the democratic transition but pessimistic about the elections will rate democratic principles as more important than respondents who were negative about the transition but optimistic towards the 2004 general elections. In addition, the latter political science students who historically were negative about the transition to democracy and presently positive

about the 2004 elections will resolve the conflict by undervaluing the importance of democratic principles more than respondents consistently negative about democracy and the elections.

Sample

The 317 participants in this study were surveyed between February and April before the 2004 elections in July and September. They were political science and international relations students with a convenience sample of at least 100 students from three universities in Java, Indonesia's most populous island.⁷ The female (57.1%) and male (42.3%) students ranged in age from 17 to 26 years ($M = 20.32$, $SD = 1.36$). When given the option of reporting religion 51.4% were Islamic, 27.8% Christian, 0.9% Hindu, 0.9% Buddhist, and 18.9% gave no answer that was coded as no response (nr). Although 76.3% (2.5% nr) of the students were not interested in joining a political party, 43.2% (2.8% nr) wanted to work for the government in the future and 72.9% (3.5% nr) would rather work for the non-governmental sector to make political changes in Indonesia.

Results

Examination of Negative and Positive Developments (Hypothesis 1)

Political transitions are highly contentious events, and there is no clear consensus among scholars about the necessary preconditions or the salience of factors which trigger such transitions. For instance, one may question whether a specific level of economic development or political consciousness has to be achieved before a sustainable transition can take place. In the case of Indonesia, there were decades of economic growth under an authoritarian system which gave rise to an emerging middle class, after which economic crisis and civil unrest precipitated the transition towards democracy. Scholars tend to assert that strong majorities consisting of a vocal middle class should support democracy, allowing the transition to take root and eventually be consolidated, although this is not always the case (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

In this study, 93.7% (1.6% nr) of students surveyed supported the democratic movement in Indonesia, whereas the negative respondents (0.6% nr) preferred some form of authoritarianism (1.9%), socialist democracy (1.6%) or liberal Islam (0.6%). While such a high percentage may be attributed to the selectivity of this sample and the level of student sophistication about politics, support for democracy in Indonesia appears to be extremely high by a world-wide comparison (Lagos, 2003). Nevertheless, when asked 'Have there been negative developments since Indonesia's political transition in 1998', 94% (2.5% nr) of respondents stated that there had been negative consequences from the transition. The students were then asked to list two negative developments, and as can be seen in Table 1, 20.1% of the total listed economic decline as the major negative aspect of the transitional era.

Table 1 Open-Ended Questions about Attitudes towards Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy in Indonesia

Negative developments	Biggest current problem	Positive developments
20.1% economic decline	23.8% corruption	30.2% free press
19.3% insecurity	19.9% economic decline	27.8% civil liberties
15.6% political instability	13.7% weak political system	17.2% electoral reforms
15.2% social problems	9.8% social problems	15.1% political reforms
15.2% corruption	9.0% crisis in leadership	5.8% greater social tolerance
9.7% weak government leadership	7.2% education	1.8% economic recovery
4.3% weak legal system	6.1% weak legal system	1.1% legal reforms

Economically, during President Suharto's reign Indonesia was ranked by the IMF as one of the world's top emerging economies based on statistics such as the per capita GDP rising from \$90 in 1968 to more than \$1,000 in the mid-1990s (CNN, 1999). As we know the Asian economic crisis began whilst Suharto was still in power, meaning that economic decline began prior to the democratic transition in 1998 (Clark, 2001). Given that the student respondents were aware of this, it seems that they blamed post-transition leaders for their inability to achieve rapid economic recovery. Thus any new administration had to cope with disproportionate public expectations and the political demands that arise from transitional periods, while at the same time encumbered by the new standards of budgetary accountability demanded at home and fiscal policy being imposed by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

At the end of the questionnaire, students were asked 'At the present time, what is the biggest problem in Indonesia?' and the problem of corruption was answered 23.8% of the time, followed by economic decline at 19.9%. Based on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index from 2005, Indonesia ranked 140 out of 159 countries surveyed, just ahead of Iraq in terms of its score based on the perceptions of business people and country analysts, who rated Indonesia as 'highly corrupt' (Lambsdorff, 2006). In a cross-national/multi-state study of governance, President Suharto received the second highest score on efficiency and yet also one of the lowest scores on accountability (Hyden *et al.*, 2004). He stands accused of embezzling billions of dollars through lucrative government contracts, of establishing complex elite networks, of fostering inter-group hostility, and controlling the press (MacIntyre, 2001).

During times of crisis Suharto also proved capable of manipulating the political system and appeasing public opinion. He would intermittently acknowledge the problem of corruption, and when public pressure was sufficient there would be dramatic intervention. For instance, in 1985 Suharto disempowered the entire customs bureau because of waterfront corruption; in 1986 he disbanded the cotton import monopoly; and in 1996 he publicly humiliated the Ministry of Transport when corruption became too blatant (MacIntyre, 2001). Currently, President Yudhoyono has initiated several high-profile anti-corruption campaigns such as

prosecuting the governor of Aceh province along with two others and five members of the General Elections Commission have been convicted of corruption along with many lower-ranking officials (Tupai, 2006).

In addition to considering corruption to be biggest problem in Indonesia (Table 1), 97.2% (0.6% nr) of students responded 'yes' when asked 'Do you feel that there is a "culture of corruption" in Indonesia'. This suggests that the students might be inclined to blame their culture, customs and traditions for the problem of corruption as opposed to flaws in the political and legal system that often grants immunity/impunity to the most blatant abusers (Robertson-Snape, 1999). On the other hand, the 'culture' mentioned could refer to an administrative culture of corruption whereby politicians, businessmen, generals, judges and executives may form intricate networks of collusion, striking clandestine deals that monopolize wealth and distort development (Tyson, 2003). Within a culture of corruption people may find themselves in positions of influence and will quickly learn how to misuse their authority and avoid the repercussions. Ultimately, the abuse of public office for private gain threatens the viability of democratic principles and public trust in the political system. In this survey, the students' remedy for Indonesia's 'culture of corruption' was increasing freedom of expression and strengthening democratic principles such as government accountability and transparency.

Positive attitudes towards democracy were surveyed with two questions. The first question asked: 'Overall, have the years since the transition from the New Order era to democracy in Indonesia brought about positive changes?' and 68.5% (4.1% nr) indicated that there were positive changes. When asked 'Have there been positive developments since Indonesia's political transition in 1998', 71% (0.9% nr) responded 'yes'. The students responding 'yes' were instructed to list two positive developments, and as seen in Table 1, 30.2% listed free press, 27.8% listed civil liberties, 17.2% listed electoral reform, and 15.1% listed political reform. It is known that during the New Order constitutional guarantees for freedom of the press were usurped by the government, which retained the authority to ban any publication and forced editors into self-censorship (Robertson-Snape, 1999). In a positive development, the Information Ministry rescinded the law that allowed it to revoke a newspaper's licence for criticizing the government in 1998. Despite some critiques of press freedoms and pro-democratic reforms, these remain some of the real achievements of the transitional era.

Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy (Hypothesis 2)

One focus of this article is to contrast political science students who are positive and negative towards the transition to democracy in Indonesia by measuring the importance they attributed to democratic principles. Importance of democratic principles was rated on a scale where the number 1 was 'not important at all' and number 5 was 'of greatest importance/essential'. Of the 13 democratic principles sampled (Table 2), students rated accountability in government to be of highest

Table 2 Transition from Authoritarian Era to Democracy: Rating Democratic Principles from 1 = 'Not Important at All' to 5 = 'Of Greatest Importance/Essential', with bold indicating significant difference

Principles	Average rating	Positive developments since political transition in 1998		Positive developments since New Order era to democracy	
		Yes minus no	Significance	Yes minus no	Significance
Accountability	4.87	+0.13	$t=2.50, p<0.025$	+0.07	$t=1.29, p=0.200$
Transparency	4.73	-0.01	$t=-0.09, p=0.929$	+0.01	$t=0.06, p=0.952$
Rule of law	4.70	+0.11	$t=1.58, p=0.115$	+0.08	$t=1.09, p=0.275$
Tolerance/ pluralism	4.70	+0.11	$t=1.46, p=0.143$	+0.33	$t=4.63, p<0.001$
Independent judiciary	4.66	+0.10	$t=1.35, p=0.176$	-0.03	$t=-0.40, p=0.687$
Human rights	4.61	+0.04	$t=0.57, p=0.572$	+0.17	$t=2.15, p<0.050$
Civil society	4.46	+0.06	$t=0.69, p=0.490$	+0.11	$t=1.21, p=0.229$
Representation	4.44	+0.28	$t=3.52, p<0.001$	+0.25	$t=3.04, p<0.010$
Anti-corruption	4.34	+0.15	$t=1.33, p=0.184$	+0.12	$t=1.06, p=0.292$
Gender equality	4.34	+0.21	$t=2.09, p<0.050$	+0.16	$t=1.52, p=0.129$
Constitutional reform	4.13	+0.03	$t=0.28, p=0.778$	-0.04	$t=-0.38, p=0.706$
Equal opportunities	4.06	+0.08	$t=0.07, p=0.947$	+0.12	$t=0.98, p=0.326$
Legitimate elections	3.82	+0.59	$t=5.16, p<0.001$	+0.35	$t=2.94, p<0.010$

importance ($M=4.87, SD=0.42$), and rated legitimate, multiparty elections as the least important ($M=3.82, SD=0.92$). The high rating for government accountability and transparency is consistent with other studies which found strong public dissatisfaction in these areas (Hyden *et al.*, 2004). Corruption reflects a lack of accountability and transparency, and in the case of Indonesia this extends from the highest elected officials and judiciary down to civil servants using their position for private gain.

In the post-Suharto era, the highly centralized authoritarian regime was in some ways dismantled, but this failed to produce a quick transition towards free markets or liberal modes of governance on the same level as in Thailand (Hadiz and Robison, 2005). Observers often assume that by unravelling the state-owned sector this would shift power to popular interests and liberal democratic institutions which are accountable, transparent, and promote civil society. Although banking reforms forced many conglomerates out of import monopolies, many of them managed to move into domestic trade cartels and public infrastructure projects such as power generation and telecommunications formerly controlled by the state (Hadiz and Robison, 2005). As the structures of authoritarian rule withered under pressure from policy initiatives by the IMF and World Bank, the political and business interests nurtured by the New Order were in the best position to capitalize on the decentralization of state authority and political reforms (Tyson, 2005a). The so-called 'decentralization of corruption'

occurs as many new actors engage in subversive activities, leaving a deep ambivalence towards the effectiveness of democratic institutions in Indonesia.⁸

The second hypothesis focused on the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and predicted that Indonesian students who were positive towards the developments since the end of President Suharto's reign would rate democratic principles as more important than the 27–28% of students who were negative about the developments. Table 2 examines two questions concerning these positive developments, and with only a few exceptions, students responding 'yes' rated democratic principles as more important than those responding 'no'. Statistically significant differences depended on the wording of the question and may have been affected by a ceiling effect since many of the ratings of democratic principles were close to 5, meaning 'of greatest importance/essential'. When the question referred to the political transition in 1998, the principles of accountability, representation, gender equality, and legitimate elections were significantly higher among positive students (Table 2). The significance of representation and legitimate elections was replicated when questioned about positive developments since the New Order to democracy and added tolerance/pluralism and human rights as discriminators of positive and negative students.

Reanalysis of gender differences using more powerful analysis of variance as expected found the same main effects significant as *t*-tests in Table 2. Consequently due to reduced error variance the level of significance increased and some effects became significant. For example, the significance of gender equality for students responding to the transition in 1998 moved from $p < 0.05$ using *t*-tests to a main effect ($F(1,298) = 5.87, p < 0.025$) with free and fair elections and main effect ($F(1,298) = 4.04, p < 0.05$) with strong leadership in the analysis. The non-significant *t*-test, when the question was phrased as the transition from the New Order era, was significantly different for gender equality with free and fair elections ($F(1,289) = 3.48, p < 0.025$) and with strong leadership ($F(1,290) = 8.90, p < 0.01$).

In light of certain stereotypes about gender relations in the Muslim world, analysis of gender equality in Indonesia is an important issue, and as expected women rated ($M = 4.50, SD = 0.66$) it significantly ($t(309) = -4.35, p < 0.001$) more important than men ($M = 4.11, SD = 0.95$). Male students rated legitimate elections ($t(302) = 2.22, p < 0.05$), independent judiciary ($t(308) = 2.14, p < 0.05$) and constitutional reform ($t(307) = 2.04, p < 0.05$) more important than female university students. Assumptions that Muslim societies are resistant to gender equality are common, but the Islamic world is far too diverse to be treated as an undifferentiated whole. Empirical research has shown that attitudes towards women's issues, modernization and democracy are substantially different in the Middle East, Turkey and Indonesia, in terms of social, economic and political activities (Moghadam, 2005). However, it is sometimes difficult to reconcile gender equality with current interpretations of Islamic law (*Shari'a*), which are often biased against women with regards to family law and economic independence.

The political representation of minority political, ethnic and religious groups was consistently rated more important by positive students than negative students when answering both questions referring to the end of three decades under authoritarian rule (Table 2). The importance of representation or empowerment of minorities was significantly ($t(307) = 3.52, p < 0.001$) more important among students who perceived positive developments since 1998 ($M = 4.53, SD = 0.59$), compared to students responding 'no' ($M = 4.25, SD = 0.76$). Perceived positive changes since the New Order era were also significant ($t(297) = 3.04, p < 0.01$) and reinforced the difference between positive ($M = 4.52, SD = 0.59$) and negative students ($M = 4.27, SD = 0.77$). It was interesting that legitimate, multiparty elections proved to be the most significant ($t(303) = 5.16, p < 0.001$) discriminator of the 71% (0.9% nr) of students indicating positive developments ($M = 3.99, SD = 0.82$), compared to students responding 'no' ($M = 3.40, SD = 1.05$). In addition, when students were asked about positive changes since the transition, the significant difference was replicated ($t(214) = 2.94, p < 0.01$) which indicates that legitimate elections were more important among positive students ($M = 3.91, SD = 0.81$) than those responding negatively ($M = 3.56, SD = 1.04$).

Indonesia's Reformed 2004 Electoral Process (Hypothesis 3)

After the democratic transition, elections were scheduled for June 1999 and the frenzy of party politics yielded over a hundred parties, 48 of which were allowed to take part in the election and 21 achieved representation in parliament (Tan, 2002). Despite the early euphoria among democratization advocates over the transition from authoritarian rule, a sense of nostalgia has also been growing among the general public as well as business and intellectual elites. The pseudo-democratic New Order regime left an authoritarian legacy transmitted by an elite group with a history of collaboration with political parties. Even in an extreme multiparty system like that of Indonesia, the loci of authority only shifted from one small clique without successfully trickling down to the people (Tyson, 2004). The citizens in the middle and at the bottom of the social ladder may show less enthusiasm for these liberal democratic principles unless they translate into substantive socio-economic opportunities or improvements in livelihoods (Volpi, 2004).

In the 2004 general elections Indonesia's reformed General Election Committee (KPU) was responsible for verifying 540,000 legislative candidates, and issuing 150 million voter identity cards (Thalang, 2005). Presidential and vice-presidential candidates were nominated by coalitions of parties after the legislative elections, and five pairs attempted to win 50% of the vote which was necessary for victory. In the second round, incumbent President Megawati formed a coalition of four major parties and was expected to win. To the surprise of many, presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and vice-presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla won with 60.6% of the popular vote. Yudhoyono graduated from Indonesia's military academy in 1973 and retired from the military as a four-star general in 2000 to join the Wahid

government as Minister for Mines, and later Chief Minister for Security and Political Affairs. He was also President Megawati's Security Minister before resigning to form the Democratic Party which only got 7.45% of the vote in the legislative election (Qodari, 2005). His running mate, Jusuf Kalla, is head of the Golkar Party and enjoys much support in Eastern Indonesia given that he was born in Sulawesi. People's satisfaction with the government measured by the Indonesian Survey Institute peaked at 80% shortly after the inauguration, although it has been steadily dropping, especially in terms of economic growth and unemployment (Qodari, 2005).

In this study the difference between students optimistic about the 2004 elections and those pessimistic about the elections on the surface appears insignificant. Although legitimate elections were considered the least important principle by students, most scholars base their definition of democracy on the holding of contested elections that are authentically free and fair (Mayer, 2001). The present study queried students' election opinions by asking whether they were 'Optimistic that the general elections will be both free and fair', and whether they were 'Optimistic that the general elections will bring about strong and effective leadership'. The majority of political science students responded 'no' to questions about their optimism towards the 2004 general elections, 58.7% (2.8% nr) were not optimistic about the elections being free and fair, and 70.7% (2.8% nr) were pessimistic about electing strong and effective leadership.

The third hypothesis focused on the 2004 general elections and predicted that optimistic students who feel that the pro-democratic reforms since 1999 will result in the election of strong leaders, and that the elections will be free and fair, will rate democratic principles as more important than the majority of students pessimistic towards the elections. As seen in Table 3 the general positive differences between 'yes' and 'no' in most cases supported the hypothesis, but none of the democratic principles were found to significantly discriminate between optimistic and pessimistic students. Even the democratic principle of legitimate elections which, as expected, had the largest differences was not a significant discriminator between students either for elections being free and fair or electing strong and effective leaders.

The pessimistic mood of the majority of politics students was reflected in the results of the 2004 elections, especially in terms of leadership. A national survey in 2003 showed a substantial decline in the perceived trustworthiness of all major political parties and a decline in voter support in the parliamentary elections. For example, incumbent President Megawati's PDI-P party dropped in trust from 72% in 2002 to 50% in 2003, and the percentage of voter support for the party declined from 33.7% in the 1999 election to 18.5% in 2004 (Vaughn, 2005). The Golkar Party, strongly associated with Suharto's authoritarian regime, remained a potent political force after the 1999 election with 22.5% of the popular vote, and only declined slightly to 21.6% of the 2004 legislative vote. Golkar also declined in terms of trustworthiness, though only slightly, from 50% down to 48% in 2003 (Vaughn, 2005). The multiparty structure in Indonesia suggests a high level of volatility derived from a lack of stable party foundations in terms of policy, organization, funding and

Table 3 Indonesia's Reformed 2004 Electoral Process: Rating Democratic Principles from 1 = 'Not Important at All' to 5 = 'Of Greatest Importance/Essential'

Principles	Average rating	Optimistic that the general elections both free and fair		Optimistic that the general elections strong and effective leadership	
		Yes minus no	Significance	Yes minus no	Significance
Accountability	4.87	+0.08	$t = 1.57, p = 0.117$	+0.01	$t = 0.13, p = 0.896$
Transparency	4.73	+0.03	$t = 0.56, p = 0.580$	-0.02	$t = -0.23, p = 0.820$
Rule of law	4.70	+0.03	$t = 0.50, p = 0.619$	+0.06	$t = 0.91, p = 0.367$
Tolerance/ pluralism	4.70	-0.02	$t = -0.28, p = 0.782$	-0.01	$t = -0.14, p = 0.887$
Independent judiciary	4.66	+0.06	$t = 0.92, p = 0.357$	+0.05	$t = 0.64, p = 0.524$
Human rights	4.61	+0.04	$t = 0.64, p = 0.525$	-0.02	$t = -0.31, p = 0.760$
Civil society	4.46	+0.11	$t = 1.34, p = 0.181$	+0.09	$t = 0.96, p = 0.336$
Representation	4.44	+0.05	$t = 0.58, p = 0.560$	-0.04	$t = -0.42, p = 0.674$
Anti-corruption	4.34	+0.06	$t = 0.58, p = 0.564$	+0.04	$t = 0.35, p = 0.727$
Gender equality	4.34	-0.03	$t = -0.24, p = 0.812$	+0.06	$t = 0.55, p = 0.583$
Constitutional reform	4.13	+0.01	$t = 0.14, p = 0.778$	+0.01	$t = 0.07, p = 0.941$
Equal opportunities	4.06	+0.17	$t = 1.62, p = 0.106$	+0.01	$t = 0.12, p = 0.904$
Legitimate elections	3.82	+0.17	$t = 1.60, p = 0.111$	+0.18	$t = 1.51, p = 0.132$

constituency. Despite predictions that strife would mar the 2004 elections, there was only isolated violence associated with either presidential or legislative elections and most external agencies considered them relatively free and fair.

Cognitive Consistency between Transition and Elections (Hypothesis 4)

The fourth hypothesis focused on comparing students' evaluation of democratic principles, particularly among those that were consistently positive or negative towards the transition in 1998, and their predictions about the 2004 general elections in terms of selecting strong leaders and being free and fair. When cognitive theory probes political attitudes, at the core is a hypothesized mechanism that determines the consistency of the query with past memories, beliefs, or opinions. If these factors are congruent, then people quickly and efficiently process the information and respond to the question (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Individuals differ considerably in the degree of consistency they expect in life and from politicians or parties. Political science students who were positive towards the democratic transition and optimistic towards the elections were expected to rate democratic principles as more important than students negative about the transition and pessimistic towards the 2004 general elections. There were four combinations of 'yes/yes' and 'no/no'

responses derived from two questions focusing on the transition and two questions referring to the general elections. Analysis of these two groups of students revealed a pattern of results very similar to the students who were positive or negative towards the transition from authoritarianism (Table 2).

Of the 52 possible combinations of questions, all but four were in the predicted direction where democratic principles were rated more important by students positive about the transition to democracy and optimistic about the elections. In contrast, students consistently pessimistic about leadership in the elections and the democratic transition rated the importance of government transparency slightly more important when referring to the transition in 1998 ($M(\text{yes}) = 4.72$; $M(\text{no}) = 4.73$) and since New Order era ($M(\text{yes}) = 4.70$; $M(\text{no}) = 4.71$). Constitutional reform since the New Order era was considered more important by negative students related to free and fair elections ($M(\text{yes}) = 4.08$; $M(\text{no}) = 4.11$) and strong and effective leadership ($M(\text{yes}) = 4.13$; $M(\text{no}) = 4.18$). Although these differences are not statistically significant, constitutional reform has been a persistent issue during elections in Indonesia, especially among parties promoting Islamic traditions (Tan, 2002). Given that more than 80% of Indonesians are Muslim, secular parties cannot succeed if they appear to be opposing Islamic principles; however, constitutional reforms designed to require all Muslims to live by Islamic laws, civil and criminal, would challenge Indonesia's secular state and its long standing espousal of *Pancasila* (von der Mehden, 2005).⁹

As seen in Table 4 the most significant difference between consistently positive and negative students centres on the importance of legitimate elections. Instead of expecting that democratic elections will rescue Indonesia from its problems, pessimistic students point with nostalgia to the New Order era where social order and economic growth was achieved by limiting political freedoms (Emmerson, 2004). Government accountability, although considered extremely important, was rated significantly less important by consistently negative students compared to positive students. Optimistic students' emphasis on electoral representation and empowerment of minority groups through free and fair elections significantly distinguished

Table 4 Consistency between Authoritarian Transition and 2004 General Elections, with bold indicating significant difference

Question	Positive developments since political transition in 1998		Positive developments since New Order era to democracy	
	Free and fair (yes/yes–no/no)	Leaders (yes/yes–no/no)	Free and fair (yes/yes–no/no)	Leaders (yes/yes–no/no)
Accountability	+0.185, $p < 0.01$	+0.123, $p = 0.063$	+0.120, $p = 0.60$	+0.064, $p = 0.404$
Tolerance/ pluralism	+0.073, $p = 0.413$	+0.103, $p = 0.253$	+0.240, $p < 0.025$	+0.269, $p < 0.01$
Representation	+0.259, $p < 0.025$	+0.206, $p = 0.063$	+0.211, $p < 0.05$	+0.180, $p = 0.123$
Legitimate elections	+0.706, $p < 0.001$	+0.695, $p < 0.001$	+0.390, $p < 0.01$	+0.469, $p < 0.01$

them from students negative about the transition from authoritarian rule and elections (Table 4). The negative views towards the reform era and pessimism about the election led students to undervalue the importance of tolerance towards ethnic minorities and religious groups in contrast to consistently positive students.

Cognitive Dissonance between Transition and Elections (Hypothesis 5)

As we have seen, students consistently negative generally consider democratic principles less important than consistently positive students, however, in 46% of cases a group of ambivalent students rated democratic principles even less important than consistently negative students. As predicted by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), ambivalent students who were nostalgic for Suharto's authoritarian era but optimistic about the democratic elections resolved their discrepancy by reducing the importance of specific democratic principles. Five democratic principles were the most significant (Table 5) and new to the list is the importance of the government's anti-corruption campaign.

The most prominent factor that seems to influence people's perceptions towards both strong and effective leadership as well as free and fair elections in Indonesia is corruption. The importance of anti-corruption campaigns was rated highest among consistently positive students and lowest by ambivalent students who were negative about the transition to democracy (Table 5). Although these ambivalent students rated democratic principles the lowest in importance in all cases, the difference related to free and fair elections were statistically the most significant and *post hoc* comparisons indicated by asterisks shows which groups were significantly different from these ambivalent students, highlighted in bold.

Granted all students felt that corruption was a very important problem in Indonesia, there are several different interpretations of why ambivalence would have more extreme ratings than consistency. If the student is a member of an elite group that benefited from corruption during the authoritarian period, it would be reasonable to undervalue anti-corruption efforts especially when the elections might provide an opportunity to reinstate the elite group's influence (Webber, 2006). Another interpretation of reducing the salience of anti-corruption campaigns is due to disillusionment with past governments' efforts to eliminate indigenous corruption by superficial propaganda and show trials that do not address the causes of corruption frequently attributed to capitalism and Western ideas of competitive democracy (Voll, 2005).

Beyond the rationale for anti-corruption campaigns, ambiguous students also rated many other democratic principles such as tolerance, representation, gender equality and accountability as less important than students consistently positive or negative about the transition to democracy and elections (Table 6). *Post hoc* analyses showed which groups indicated by asterisk were significantly different from this ambivalent group highlighted in bold and a similar pattern can be seen related to selecting strong effective leaders and elections being free and fair. After a major

Table 5 Cognitive Dissonance between Authoritarian Transition and 2004 General Elections for Corruption and Tolerance for Minorities

Question		Yes	No	Significance
<i>Importance of anti-corruption campaign</i>				
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.46*	4.27	$F(1,288) = 6.71$
New Order era to democracy	No	3.83	4.35*	$p < 0.01$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.42	4.34	$F(1,288) = 2.07$
New Order era to democracy	No	3.91	4.30	$p = 0.151$
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive developments since	Yes	4.50*	4.26	$F(1,297) = 7.65$
political transition in 1998	No	3.93	4.37*	$p < 0.01$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive developments since	Yes	4.47*	4.33	$F(1,297) = 2.97$
political transition in 1998	No	3.94	4.30	$p = 0.086$
<i>Importance of tolerance/pluralism (minorities, religion, ethnic)</i>				
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.78*	4.78*	$F(1,292) = 5.80$
New Order era to democracy	No	4.15	4.54*	$p < 0.025$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.81*	4.77*	$F(1,293) = 9.98$
New Order era to democracy	No	4.00	4.54*	$p < 0.01$
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.72	4.72	$F(1,301) = 0.629$
political transition in 1998	No	4.54	4.65	$p = 0.428$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.76*	4.71*	$F(1,301) = 3.57$
political transition in 1998	No	4.38	4.66	$p = 0.060$

*Group of students that were significantly different from the ambivalent students (highlighted in bold).

political event such as the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the question is how do the university students in this study adjust their attitudes and beliefs to the new socio-economic system? In particular, what are the consistently negative and ambivalent students' rationalizations and justifications for changes in the status quo after three decades of authoritarianism? The results identify a tendency for negative students to marginalize the importance of tolerance and political representation for disadvantaged minority groups as well as gender inequality, especially among ambivalent students who were anticipating a favourable outcome from the 2004 general elections.

The function of political ideology is to provide people with the illusion of order and justice in the world. Both victims and beneficiaries of a post-authoritarian regime have a need to justify the dissonance created by their beliefs and their present situation. Psychological theory debates whether the origin of the dissonance is related to an individual's need for self-consistency or a need to remain consistent in their

Table 6 Cognitive Dissonance between Authoritarian Transition and 2004 General Elections for Representation, Gender Equality, and Accountability

Question		Yes	No	Significance
<i>Importance of representation/empowerment</i>				
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.55*	4.47*	$F(1,288) = 7.45$
New Order era to democracy	No	3.89	4.34*	$p < 0.01$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.48*	4.53*	$F(1,289) = 2.39$
New Order era to democracy	No	4.00	4.30	$p = 0.291$
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.58*	4.48*	$F(1,297) = 3.93$
political transition in 1998	No	4.07	4.32	$p < 0.05$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive developments since	Yes	4.53*	4.53*	$F(1,297) = 3.76$
political transition in 1998	No	3.94	4.32*	$p = 0.053$
<i>Importance of gender equality</i>				
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.38*	4.36*	$F(1,289) = 2.95$
New Order era to democracy	No	3.89	4.29	$p = 0.087$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.49*	4.32*	$F(1,290) = 8.21$
New Order era to democracy	No	3.67	4.30*	$p < 0.01$
		2004 elections will be free and fair		
Positive changes since	Yes	4.41*	4.37*	$F(1,298) = 1.72$
political transition in 1998	No	4.00	4.25	$p = 0.191$
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive developments since	Yes	4.43	4.38	$F(1,298) = 0.15$
political transition in 1998	No	4.13	4.17	$p = 0.702$
<i>Importance of accountability in government</i>				
		2004 elections will bring strong and effective leadership		
Positive developments since	Yes	4.94*	4.89*	$F(1,298) = 5.66$
political transition in 1998	No	4.56	4.82*	$p < 0.025$

social network and group identifications (Jost and Hunyady, 2002). Psychological discussions of politics have been criticized for committing the attribution error of assuming the source of attitudes is within the person. Multicultural research has found that in individualistic cultures, personal attitudes are correlated with personality and other intra-individual variables whereas in collectivist cultures they are more affected by social group and external variables (Hall and Barongan, 2002).

Similarly, when people experience cognitive dissonance they are assumed to change their attitudes or preferences to be consistent internally. However, in societies such as Indonesia which place greater emphasis on social identification and consensus, the individual may define self-esteem in terms of harmony with others and will sacrifice self-interest to maintain ideological consistency (Fiske, 2004). The political question

is whether people are driven by the desire to preserve a positive self-image when confronted by conflicts or whether social pressures cause them to defend the image of the group or ideology even if this comes at the expense of the self-image or self-preservation.

Conclusion

In open-ended questions, political science students identified economic decline as one of the biggest current problems in Indonesia and negative consequences of converting from an authoritarian regime to democracy. Some students who were negative about the transition from an authoritarian era, presumably threatening their status or economic networks, responded by lowering the importance of democratic principles, particularly with regards to the legitimacy of elections and participation of groups outside of their immediate sphere. In Indonesian culture, where values such as cooperation, consensus, deliberation (*musyawarah*) and concern for the common good tend to be associated, these political science students seem to have a conflict between indigenous values and modern individualistic models of democracy and competitive economics (Bowen, 1986).

The detailed profile of this small group of nostalgic students reveals that issues such as gender equality, accountability, anti-corruption initiatives and legitimate elections are viewed as significantly less important when compared with the majority of Indonesian students. The dissonant students are optimistic that elections will provide strong leadership and economic prosperity, similar in many ways to the past authoritarian era which excluded minorities, reduced government accountability and restricted democratic freedoms. The ambivalent students who had a negative reaction to the post-authoritarian era in Indonesia may have seen democratic elections as a means to protect their economic self-interest or as a way to empower an ideological group, whether based on religion, ethnicity, or elitism.

Consequently, the Indonesian democratic initiatives that accompanied the extensive political upheaval from authoritarian rule and struggle for systemic modernization must draw upon the cooperation of diverse groups to maintain a unified country. It is often assumed that reforms at the national level set the tone for changes locally, throughout the archipelago, although it has often been found that local initiatives are in fact more progressive or at least responsive to the demands of the local population (Tyson, 2005a). What needs to be considered in future research is how the nostalgia for the New Order and its mechanisms for maintaining central authoritarian rule impact the current decentralization process in Indonesia whereby regional, district and local actors are increasingly empowered and engaged in the political process. The new generation of Indonesian students is not unified in their perceptions of history or importance of democratic institutions and thus it is important to understand their opinions and attitudes during this transitional stage in political development.

Notes

- [1] Facing mounting political pressure and rising public discontent, Sukarno adopted what he called a system of 'guided democracy' in an attempt to preserve his authority.
- [2] The communist purges swept throughout Indonesia, with concentrations of violence in Java and Bali, leading to estimates of up to 500,000 fatalities (of suspected or real communists) over a period of one year.
- [3] Prior to these elections, J. B. Habibie served as caretaker president. He was a close associate of Suharto, although he did push for reforms and in some aspects embraced the spirit of democracy.
- [4] Although the focus was on Jakarta, on 11 May 1998 Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Central Java, was host to the largest student demonstration the country had seen for 20 years (McRae, 1999).
- [5] Interview with faculty member from Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on 2 March 2004.
- [6] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono approved the lifting of subsidies on refined petroleum products commonly referred to as *Bahan Bakar Minyak* (BBM) leading to substantial price increases and public outcry (Tyson, 2005b). Previous leaders have also tried to push ahead with this reform, but buckled under public and political pressure. SBY's 'Bitter Pill' speech acknowledged the short-term difficulties this new policy would cause, but also appealed to the public to accept such changes as in the long-term national interest. He also introduced a compensation policy for poor families across the archipelago, which resembles the makings of a welfare system.
- [7] These were the University of Indonesia, Depok; Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung; and Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
- [8] In 'A Better Class of Corruption', Ross H. McLeod (2000) raises some interesting comparisons between systems of centralized and managed corruption versus decentralized and uncontrolled systems of corruption.
- [9] When Indonesia was struggling to define itself during the period of independence there were competing forces, some advocating Islamic principles as enshrined in the Jakarta Charter, and others advocating the secular principles of *Pancasila*. The latter won the debate, although there are groups in Indonesia that have yet to abandon the goal of institutionalizing Islamic law and principles in Indonesia. In Java, distinctions have been made between Muslims categorized as traditionalist and orthodox (*santri*) and those known to be more syncretic (*abangan*), blending indigenous customs with religion (Geertz, 1960).

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